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Abstract
Background: Decentralisation aims to bring services closer to the community and has been advocated in the 
health sector to improve quality, access and equity, and to empower local agencies, increase innovation and 
efficiency and bring healthcare and decision-making as close as possible to where people live and work. Fiji 
has attempted two approaches to decentralisation. The current approach reflects a model of deconcentration 
of outpatient services from the tertiary level hospital to the peripheral health centres in the Suva subdivision. 
Methods: Using a modified decision space approach developed by Bossert, this study measures decision space 
created in five broad categories (finance, service organisation, human resources, access rules, and governance 
rules) within the decentralised services.
Results: Fiji’s centrally managed historical-based allocation of financial resources and management of human 
resources resulted in no decision space for decentralised agents. Narrow decision space was created in the 
service organisation category where, with limited decision space created over access rules, Fiji has seen greater 
usage of its decentralised health centres. There remains limited decision space in governance. 
Conclusion: The current wave of decentralisation reveals that, whilst the workload has shifted from the 
tertiary hospital to the peripheral health centres, it has been accompanied by limited transfer of administrative 
authority, suggesting that Fiji’s deconcentration reflects the transfer of workload only with decision-making in 
the five functional areas remaining largely centralised. As such, the benefits of decentralisation for users and 
providers are likely to be limited.
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Implications for policy makers
• The potential benefits of decentralisation, such as closer community involvement in services, may be limited when decision space is not 
created. It is important for policy-makers to give attention not only to transfer of workload, but also to localised decision-making. 
• Localised decision space needs to be created in terms of finance, service organisation, human resources, access rules, and governance rules to 
realise the benefits of decentralisation.
Implications for public
This study provides the public with an understanding of the decentralisation policy in Fiji that is yet to be sufficiently evaluated. Public understanding 
of the policy could encourage support for ongoing reforms in the country. 
Key Messages 
Background 
Fundamental changes to health systems and the delivery of 
healthcare have been advocated globally.1,2 This push to reform 
has been particularly evident in developing countries where 
decentralisation has been promoted as one way to improve 
the delivery of health services and its outcomes.3 Fiji is no 
exception, with two waves of health sector decentralisation 
having taken place since 1999. However, there has been 
limited evaluation of these reforms. This paper examines 
the decentralisation process being implemented in the Suva 
subdivision since 2009, using the decision space analytical 
framework developed by Bossert.4 In doing so the aim of 
this paper is not to evaluate the impact of the reforms on 
outcomes, but to assess the extent to which different functions 
have actually been decentralised. 
Approaches to Decentralisation
Decentralisation has been central to health services 
development and reform in developing countries, aiming 
to encourage community involvement and increase health 
services’ responsiveness to the community. This reflects 
the Alma Ata Declaration in 1979 which highlighted the 
importance of bringing healthcare and decision-making 
as close as possible to where people live and work.5 Whilst 
decentralisation of health services has been widely promoted 
since the 1970s, how the concept is defined lacks conceptual 
clarity.6,7 There is, however, an emerging consensus that 
decentralisation broadly refers to the transfer of authority 
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to manage, plan and make decisions, from the central 
government to agencies and actors at lower levels.1,7-11
Decentralisation, in its many forms, seeks to promote a 
more effective and efficient system aimed at rectifying a top-
down bureaucratic structure and improving government 
responsiveness to the public.4,8,10,12 Among its many 
promises, decentralisation aims to bring services closer to 
people,8,10,13 improve access to services,1,8 allow for community 
participation,12,14 improve employee morale and turnover15 
and place particular emphasis on improving quality, access 
and equity, empowering local governments and increasing 
innovation and efficiency.8-10 However, decentralisation is 
difficult to implement. As such the intended benefits may 
not necessarily be achieved and may not result in greater 
community participation, access for all communities and 
greater equity.2,7,8 
Although there is some agreement on the expected benefits of 
decentralisation, the ways in which it has been implemented 
has varied across countries.1 Decentralisation in health 
systems may be functional or geographical in nature.1 
Functional decentralisation involves the transfer of specific 
responsibilities from the central agency at the national level 
to specialised agencies at national or subnational levels. 
Geographical decentralisation involves the transfer of wide-
ranging responsibilities from the central agency to subnational 
organisations that have precise geographical and political 
boundaries.2,16 With that understanding in mind, three 
forms of decentralisation (deconcentration, delegation, and 
devolution) were proposed by Rondinelli.2 These were further 
refined by Mills16 to include a fourth form (privatisation). 
However, individual country experiences of decentralisation 
seldom fit precisely into one of the types mentioned above. 
Countries experiment with varying degrees and approaches 
to decentralisation and may use a combination of models to 
meet their needs and to achieve their particular objectives.1
Deconcentration is the least imposing form of decentralisation. 
It involves moving some workload from the central national 
ministry or agency to subnational levels.2 This shifting of 
workload may also involve the transfer of administrative 
authority, but not political authority, to the subnational levels.16 
Where there is a shifting of authority to the lower levels, 
deconcentration takes one of two forms: field administration 
and local administration.2 The former involves the transfer 
of decision-making to staff at lower levels, thereby allowing 
the local health services to be responsive to local needs 
by engaging local staff in planning and decision-making 
functions. Local administration, on the other hand, is where 
subnational levels are agents of a central office and all local 
functions are undertaken through the technical supervision 
and control of a central office. 
Delegation involves the transfer of decision-making as well 
as administrative  authority for well-defined functions to 
agencies that are not part of the central ministry but over 
which the ministry retains some level of indirect control.2 
These agencies have an independent status that is established 
under law and a management board or board of trustees holds 
management authority and decision-making responsibilities.16 
Devolution, on the other hand, involves the creation or 
reinforcement of subnational levels of government that then 
undertake a fixed set of functions from the central ministry. 
These independent agencies have a clear legal status with 
geographically-defined boundaries as well as having the 
statutory authority to raise revenue and determine their 
expenditure. 
Privatisation is the most extreme form of decentralisation. It 
involves the transfer of functions that would normally have 
been performed by the central ministry to organisations it 
does not own, and which are independent and outside the 
control of the central ministry. Whilst the central ministry 
does not control the organisation, it may influence its 
behaviour through government regulations and financial 
incentives and disincentives.1 
Using Decision-Making as a Measure of Decentralisation
Bossert4 developed an approach to measure the degree of 
decentralisation based on the transfer of decision-making. 
The decision space tool proposes a set of indicators which 
can be used to map decision space under the four approaches 
to decentralisation. As a tool, it has been used to highlight 
the degree of choice exercised by decentralised agencies 
over different organisational functions in several developing 
countries.4,13,14,17,18 This tool is based on a modified principal-
agent approach developed by economists to measure 
relationships within a defined ‘principal’ and ‘agent’ setting.19 
The principal-agent approach conceptualises a ‘principal’ with 
specific objectives, and ‘agents’ who are engaged to achieve 
those objectives. The benefit of this approach is that it allows 
for the examination of the dynamic and evolving relationship 
between the central office (ie, the principal) and peripheral 
agents following decentralisation. Bossert’s decision space 
tool is used in this study to gain insights into the current 
decentralisation approach in Fiji.
Fiji’s Approach to Decentralisation
The Ministry of Health (MoH) is the principal healthcare 
funder and provider in Fiji. The delivery of healthcare to its 
887 000 people is challenging in a country that comprises 332 
islands spread over 1.3 million square kilometres of the South 
Pacific Ocean.20 Health services are delivered through three 
geographical divisions: the jointly administered Central and 
Eastern Divisions, Western Division and Northern Division, 
each having several subdivisions.21 Divisional hospitals 
provide tertiary and secondary level care whilst subdivisional 
hospitals provide primary and limited secondary care. Each 
subdivision has several health centres providing primary care, 
intended as the first point of contact for most users, and the 
basic unit in the health services infrastructure. Depending 
on their size and level, health centres are staffed by medical 
officers, nurses, midwives, and ancillary staff. 
Successive governments have called for a more responsive 
healthcare system that makes healthcare accessible to all 
its citizens through strengthened divisional structures and 
improved community-based services, and by addressing 
community dissatisfaction with health services.22-29 Reviews 
carried out since 1979 highlighted the need to decentralise 
Fiji’s healthcare system in order to improve service delivery. 
They concluded that the MoH did not delegate responsibility, 
authority and planning to the regional divisions, which 
resulted in poor morale, high turnover, high number of staff 
transfers, inadequate staff numbers, and shortages of drugs 
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at health facilities. The reviews also recommended that 
measures be taken to encourage those patients self-referring 
to Suva’s main tertiary hospital (Colonial War Memorial 
[CWM] Hospital) to instead attend outpatient clinics at the 
peripheral health centres and at the subdivisional hospitals 
nearest to their homes and places of employment.22-25,30,31
In response, Fiji has experimented with two waves of health 
sector decentralisation, separated by a brief but abandoned 
attempt at re-centralisation, detailed below. The first wave of 
decentralisation (1999-2004) aimed at devolving the health 
system geographically, and is considered the most ambitious 
of the two waves of reforms. However, its lack of acceptance 
by many in the health sector hindered implementation, and 
coupled with continuing political instability in Fiji, resulted in 
re-centralisation in 2008. Following the Fijian Government’s 
change in policy and a renewed focus to improve health 
services’ accessibility to the general public,26,27 the second 
wave of decentralisation began in 2009. These reforms are 
detailed below to provide context for the study. 
Health Sector Reform (1999-2004) 
In 1999 the Minister for Health initiated the Fiji Health 
Management Reform Project, with the aim of improving 
healthcare and health outcomes and improving decision-
making by bringing it as close as possible to the point of 
implementation.32,33 The reform also aimed to improve 
customer-focused service delivery at primary, secondary, and 
tertiary levels.33,34
With the support of AUSAid funding and expertise, the 
reform project was aimed at devolving Fiji’s centralised health 
system after a legacy of British rule.35 Prior to decentralisation, 
there was a central ministry with four administrative 
divisions and the reform project proposed the creation and 
strengthening of divisional levels within the MoH. As a result, 
the central office was strengthened and three geographical 
divisions were created to focus on health service delivery.33 
The roles of the central office and the geographical divisions 
were delineated, with the central office having four areas of 
operation to support its functions of (1) policy development, 
(2) national health service planning, (3) monitoring and 
evaluation, and (4) legislative and regulatory compliance. 
This allowed the central office to provide technical and 
supervisory support to the geographical divisions responsible 
for the delivery of health services in their respective areas. 
Proposed legislation would have enabled those divisional 
structures to become corporate legal entities to be responsible 
for their own planning and control systems and for quality 
management. The legislation would have also allowed them 
to enter into contracts, manage their own budgets and 
human resources, and have powers to delegate functions to 
organisations outside the ministry.36 This would have allowed 
a truly devolved structure to emerge. However, the proposed 
legislation was never enacted, and with waning interest 
resulting from four changes of government in the 5-year 
implementation period for the decentralisation project, 
reform was only partially implemented. 
Roll-back of Health Reform (2008)
In 2005, with AUSAid funding extinguished and health 
sector reform incomplete, no further work was carried 
out from 2005 until 2008. In February 2008, many of the 
decentralisation initiatives carried out under the first wave 
were reversed.37 What has popularly been termed as the ‘roll-
back of health sector reform,’ meant that changes made to 
the MoH during the reform period were abandoned and the 
MoH reverted to a centralised system. Political instability and 
changes of governments, along with a lack of implementation 
of the reforms and decentralisation objectives having not 
been achieved, have widely been seen as the reasons for the 
‘roll-back.’38
Decentralisation of Health Services (2009 to Present)
Ten years after the first wave, the second wave of 
decentralisation was initiated in March 2009, with a more 
modest aim of improving access to health services in the 
Suva subdivision only.39 Heeding calls from the Government 
to improve ‘physical and financial access to good-quality 
health services,’26 the MoH initiated a pilot process of 
deconcentrating outpatient services from the divisional 
hospital in the Suva subdivision to six health centres located 
within its geographical boundaries, which serve a quarter of 
Fiji’s population.21,26,27 As a pilot project, the deconcentration 
was only intended for the Suva subdivision. This involved 
strengthening the health centres and designating the CWM 
Hospital as a referral service that the general population in 
the Suva subdivision could access only by being referred.40
Strengthening of these six health centres took place over a 
2-year period starting from March 2009. Hours of operation 
at the six health centres increased from 8 to 16 hours per 
day in weekdays (from 8 am-4:30 pm to 6:30 am-10 pm) and 
began to open in the weekend for 8 hours per day from 8 
am-4 pm.41-43 In addition service hours at the health centres 
were extended, and services provided at these health centres 
were improved and upgraded through a boost to human 
resources, infrastructure, consumables and medications, 
equipment, transport and administration.43-46 The CWM 
Hospital subsequently stopped providing adult outpatient 
services from the end of February 2011. With decentralisation 
in the Central Division deemed a success, the MoH has 
proposed a roll-out of decentralisation policy to the Northern 
and Western Divisions.39,40 While deemed a success, there is 
no evidence of the impacts of the decentralisation process on 
the different functions of the MoH. This study attempts to fill 
that gap by examining the extent to which various functions 
have actually been decentralised. 
Methods
This desktop analysis is based on available documentary 
sources, studies, reviews, technical reports, policy documents, 
and position papers covering the period 1979 to 2014. This 
allowed for comparisons to be made between the first and 
second reforms. However, the primary focus of the analysis is 
on the period after 2008, following roll-back of the first wave 
of reforms and the second decentralisation process in 2009. 
All documents collected were in the English language, this 
being the official language of Fiji. Requests for unpublished 
studies, opinion papers, and position papers were made 
through personal communications with Fiji’s MoH with 
access granted as part of the ethics approval. 
Incomplete documents were excluded and the remainder 
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sorted by decentralisation period. The contents were then 
analysed by examining the implications of decentralisation on 
finance, service organisation, human resources, access rules 
and governance as outlined in Table 1.
The decision space framework has been employed in a 
number of settings to analyse decentralisation including 
Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Uganda, Zambia, Ghana, 
Philippines, and Pakistan.14,17,18,47-49 The decision space 
framework comprises five categories of functions: finance, 
service organisation, human resources, access rules and 
governance, as shown in Table 1.4,14,17,48 The framework 
examines both what is allowed by the central authority and 
what the agency actually exercises following decentralisation 
(whether through deconcentration, delegation, devolution 
or privatisation). The approach estimates the changes to the 
decision space within each of these functions and classifies 
the change as being narrow, moderate, or wide. 
A modified decision space approach for Fiji was used for 
this study. This framework was chosen for its applicability 
to developing countries and because it is based on the 
principal agent approach which forms the underlying basis 
for Fiji’s current wave of decentralisation. The decision space 
framework defines the choice allowed by the principal to the 
agent. However, a notable criticism of this tool is that it is a 
formal map of the decision space which may not reflect the 
actual range of decisions that the agent may have in countries 
where laws are not enforced or easily violated by the agent. 
In applying Bossert’s framework for mapping decision space 
to this study, the ‘principal’ refers to the MoH central office 
and the ‘agents’ refer to the six decentralised health centres 
in the Suva subdivision. Other notable government agencies 
that influence decision-making that will be alluded to in the 
following discussions are the Public Services Commission 
(PSC) and the Ministry of Finance (MoF).
The mapping used the same broad categories identified by 
Bossert; however, only functions applicable to Fiji’s public 
health sector were used to guide this analysis of decision space 
in Fiji. For example, Fiji has no insurance plans for the public 
health services, thus this was removed when creating the 
decision space map. An additional measure of ‘no choice’ was 
added to the range of choices for Fiji’s decision space map to 
indicate where agents had no choice for a particular function.
Results 
An examination of the current wave of decentralisation 
reveals that, whilst the workload has shifted from the 
CWM Hospital to the peripheral health centres (refer to 
Table 2), it has been accompanied by only limited transfer of 
administrative authority, suggesting that Fiji’s reforms reflect 
limited deconcentration in the form of transfer of workload. 
Each indicator and function is described in detail in the 
following sections.
Finance
In Fiji, the MoF is responsible for public sector funding 
which is released to the respective ministries through a 
yearly budget allocation. The process involves consultation 
with the various central offices of each ministry. In the case 
of the MoH, each of the three geographical divisions devise 
a divisional business plan in consultation with the central 
office which, once approved, provides a basis for the MoH 
budgetary request from the MoF. The Central Office uses 
actual expenditure incurred over the past years as a means 
of determining divisional allocations. Subdivisions draw 
their respective budgets from their divisions. Health centres 
have no specific budgetary allocation and need to rely on 
their respective subdivisions.
Whilst the divisions, subdivisions and health centres have 
some input into their budgetary allocation, it is largely 
centrally controlled. The principal has wider powers 
compared to the agent in determining the sources of revenue. 
Decentralisation shifted outpatient services to health centres 
in the Suva subdivision in 2009. An examination of total 
government health expenditure (TGHE) over the second 
Table 1. Bossert’s Framework for Mapping Decision Space
Category Function Indicators
Finance
Sources of revenue Intergovernmental transfers as a % of total health spending
Allocation of expenditure % of local spending that is explicitly earmarked by higher authorities
Income from fees and contracts Range of prices local authorities are allowed to choose
Contracts Number of models allowed
Service Organisation
Hospital autonomy Choice of range of autonomy for hospitals
Insurance plans Choice of how to design insurance plans
Payment mechanisms Choice of how providers will be paid
Required programs Specificity of norms for local programs
Human Resources
Salaries Choice of salary range
Contracts Contracting of non-permanent staff
Civil service Hiring and firing of permanent staff
Access Rules
Targeting Defining priority populations
Governance Rules
Facility boards Size and composition of boards
Health offices Size and composition of local offices
Community participation Size, number, composition, and role of community participation
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decentralisation period reveals the percentage allocated 
nationally to outpatient services declined from 27.3% and 
27.5% [$41.6 million and $42.0 million] of TGHE in 2009 and 
2010 respectively to 19.4% and 19.6% [$27.6 million and $30.1 
million] of TGHE in 2011 and 2012.50-52 Interestingly, the 
percentage of TGHE allocated to ambulatory care providers 
who are the focus of decentralisation, also declined from 
9.4% and 11.5% [$14.3 million and $17.6 million] in 2009 
and 2010 to 5.7% and 7.2% [$8.2 million to $11.1 million] 
in 2011 and 2012. Hospitals continued to be allocated the 
majority of TGHE despite a transfer of services from the 
hospital to the health centres, although a slight decline can 
be seen from 77.2% and 74.6% [$117.9 million and $114.1 
million] of TGHE in 2009 and 2010 respectively to 73.2% 
and 68.2% [$104.4 million and $105.8 million] of TGHE in 
2011 and 2012. The extensive nature of devolution in the first 
wave of decentralisation could be a factor in the differences in 
financial allocation between the two decentralisation periods; 
however, this requires further investigation. 
It is important to note that the expenditure figures for 
outpatient services quoted above apply to the total allocation 
of funds to outpatient services countrywide, and not 
specifically to the services that are being decentralised in 
the Suva subdivision. With no specific recorded budgetary 
allocation to the health centres in the Suva subdivision, the 
recording reflects a divisional breakdown. The principal’s 
allocation to the central division health centres (of which 
Suva is one of five subdivisions), was $6.4 million in 2009, 
$7.9 million in 2010, $2.4 million in 2011, and $3.9 million 
in 2012. With decentralisation shifting workload from the 
divisional hospital to the health centres, an increase in the 
funding allocated to health centres would have been expected, 
not the reduction in allocations to the health centres that is 
reported. This decline is consistent with a decline in overall 
spending on outpatient services nationally, however. 
Turning now to the allocation of expenditure, an examination 
reveals that the health centres have little decision space 
over the funding earmarked for them by the central office. 
The subdivisions, through their respective divisions, submit 
business plans which outline activities for the next year. 
These activities are linked to the strategic plan of the MoH, 
government strategic vision and international obligations 
signed by the government.26,27,53,54 The divisional business 
plans guide the central office in the allocation of expenditure 
for health centres which have little scope to decide on its 
use. The recent decentralisation process has seen specific 
expenditures marked for health centres, specifically for the 
upgrading and maintenance of health centres and investment 
in equipment for health centres55-57; these funds must be used 
as earmarked. 
The fee that can be charged by the decentralised health centres 
is determined by the Public Hospitals and Dispensaries Act. 
This legislation narrows the decision space of the agent by 
determining when they can charge fees and how much they 
can charge. As part of the government’s initiative to provide 
universal healthcare to the citizens of Fiji, the health centres 
cannot charge fees to patients who self-refer to health centres. 
They can only charge set fees to patients who have been 
referred to public health services from a private service and 
patients who are not citizens of Fiji.58,59 However, the Act does 
allow for discretionary powers by the medical officer to waive 
any fees prescribed in the Act.
Service Organisation
Decentralisation of outpatient services did not flow through 
to increased health centre autonomy which is defined by 
law through the Public Hospitals and Dispensaries Act. The 
legislation gives some discretionary powers to the health 
centres in its normal day to day functions, vested in the medical 
officer in-charge of the health centre and gives the medical 
officer discretionary powers to treat patients.58,60 Other 
decisions are made in consultation with the subdivisional 
and divisional medical officers. The medical officer-in-charge 
having leeway in day-to-day operations of the health centre 
has resulted in variances in how service delivery is organised 
for walk-in users.
Health centres are classified according to the size of the 
population that they serve, and their location and distance 
from the referral hospital. A higher ranking (Level A being 
the highest and Level C being the lowest) ensures a higher 
quota of drugs and supplies in more regular frequency. 
Following decentralisation, the level of each health centre 
in the Suva subdivision increased (leaving no Level C health 
centre). This resulted in increased quota and frequency of 
Table 2. Daily Workload at Health Facilities Before and After Decentralisation
Health Facility
2010a 2011 (February)b 2011 (March)c
Average Daily 
Workload
Average Time Spent 
per User
Average Daily 
Workload
Average Time Spent 
per User
Average Daily 
Workload
Average Time Spent 
per User
Lami Health Centre 36 8.3 min 100 8.6 min 123 6.7 min
Samabula Health Centre 45 10.0 min 108 7.5 min 149 5.0 min
Raiwaqa Health Centred 24 33.0 min - - 197 4.3 min
Nuffield Health Centre 36 12.3 min 101 8.0 min 125 6.7 min
Valelevu Health Centre 52 4.4 min 254 3.0 min 299 2.8 min
Makoi Health Centre 43 6.8 min 222 4.6 min 255 3.3 min
CWM – GOPD 31 15.0 min 39 12.0 min - -
CWM – A&Ef 23 20.0 min 24 20.0 min 21 20.0 min
Abbreviations: GOPD, General Outpatient Department; CWM, Colonial War Memorial Hospital; A&E, Accident and Emergency.
a Denotes averages for the 2010 period.
b Denotes averages for February 2011 prior to closure of GOPD services at CWM Hospital.
c Denotes averages for March 2011 following closure of GOPD services at CWM Hospital.
d Ministry of Health (MoH) reports indicate not data was supplied by Raiwaqa Health Centre for February 2011. 
f CWM A&E Department provides GOPD services after closure of Health Centres at 10 pm. Represents Night Shift (10 pm to 7 am) data only.
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supplies, but without increased autonomy, relegating them to 
deconcentrated entities without administrative authority. 
The central office sets priorities at a national level and allows 
the divisional levels some autonomy in achieving them. The 
central office works with divisional medical officers to ensure 
that divisional priorities are aligned with those at national 
level.53,54,61 Similar health programmes are seen across the 
decentralised health centres, reflecting centralised priority 
setting. However, health centres have some flexibility in 
offering programmes above the basic package required by 
the central office. The ranking of the health centre also 
determines the services delivered there, with higher ranked 
health centres being able to deliver more services, specifically 
more diagnostic and ancillary services, in addition to having 
higher allocations of supplies and drugs from the central 
office. 
Human Resources
Creating decision space in the management of human 
resources is difficult in Fiji due to the high degree of 
centralisation of the civil services. The civil services are 
managed by the PSC with little or no control by the respective 
ministries. The PSC governs all aspects of human resources 
from determining the requirements of each ministry, 
determining the number of establishments, selection, setting 
salaries, appointment, training, appraisal, promotion, and 
discipline.62-64
For a brief period during the first wave of reform, the PSC 
delegated authority to the MoH to manage its own human 
resources as part of wider government reforms. However, this 
delegation was revoked following a change in government.37 
No attempt to delegate such powers was made in the current 
decentralisation process, with contracting of permanent 
and non-permanent staff, increasing of staff numbers, 
determination of salary range and the ability to hire and 
fire remaining vested outside the powers of the agent and 
central office. 
 
Access Rules
Access rules that determine the health programmes delivered 
by health centres to targeted populations are determined by 
a centrally defined package of health services. This package 
is guided by the strategic vision of the Fijian government, 
as well as its international obligations and prevailing health 
trends in the divisions.26,27,54,61 The central office requires that 
the health centres deliver the following package of health 
services: communicable and non-communicable disease 
services, family planning, maternal and child health and 
mental health services. Being centrally determined, this 
package is fairly consistent across the different health centres 
with centrally defined priority populations. Each health 
centre has some flexibility in adding to this list based on the 
needs of the populations that they cater to. The health centres 
also have flexibility in referring users to other services in cases 
where they do not have adequate resources to offer treatment. 
Whilst each health centre’s ability to offer treatment varies, 
referral activity between health centres is not high, but there 
is a notable number of referrals from the health centres to the 
divisional hospital.
Governance Rules
Local governance and community participation have long 
been advocated as part of decentralisation in Fiji.31 The 
current deconcentration model of decentralisation provides 
some mechanisms for local governance although the 
governance structure is largely centralised. Each health centre 
has a ‘board of visitors,’ which has limited influence over some 
decisions. The Minister for Health, not local communities or 
agents, appoints members of the board, and these members 
are accountable to the Minister. Legislation empowers the 
board of visitors decision space over maintenance and repair 
of the health centres, and for ensuring that the health facility 
is well-equipped and has the necessary technology to deliver 
quality care.59 This gives the board of visitors some degree 
of influence over the decisions that are made at each health 
centre. The legislation also empowers the board of visitors to 
partner with private bodies to fulfil any of its functions. 
Community participation in local health institutions is 
limited. Community health workers are involved in the 
delivery of health services, but their ability to influence the 
system based on this interaction with the communities is 
limited. Zone nurses based at each health centre form a key 
link between the health centre and the community in the 
provision of health services. They are often the first point of 
contact for communities and periodically deliver basic health 
services to communities within the catchment of the health 
centre. However, this link does not translate to increased 
community participation in the health centre. Other than 
through the membership of the board of visitors, there is no 
provision to have the community participate in the health 
facilities. 
Table 3 summarises decision space in the Suva subdivision of 
Fiji, where decentralisation (involving a transfer of workload) 
has been initiated.
Discussion and Conclusion
Decentralisation is advocated as a way to improve the efficiency 
of delivery of health services and their responsiveness to 
community needs. In developing countries, decentralisation 
is also seen as a means to improve access to healthcare. 
However, to realise these benefits, a localised decision space 
needs to be created in terms of finance, service organisation, 
human resources, access rules, and governance rules. 
This analysis shows that Fiji’s current decentralisation 
process involves little more than the transfer of workload for 
ambulatory care from hospital to health centre. In the case 
of the Fijian health system, deconcentration is the form of 
decentralisation used and this has created limited decision 
space for the health centres to which workload has been 
transferred. It remains unclear whether the Government 
intends to transfer authority to these health centres. 
A critical question is whether such limited decentralisation 
can produce the intended benefits. The decision space 
map shows that for finance, the current decentralisation 
process neither allows for the health centres to source their 
own revenue nor determine their expenditures. With Fiji’s 
system of national health accounts being in its infancy, 
little or no financial information exists at the health centre 
level. Historical allocation of resources means that there 
is an inequitable distribution of financial resources in 
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response to varying demands placed on each health centre. 
Financial autonomy has generally resulted in benefits for 
health systems14,17,49 and the decentralisation of the finance 
function can contribute to a more equitable utilisation of 
health services.18 However, this is unlikely to be realised in 
Fiji’s current deconcentration approach. Calls made by health 
workers for population-based allocation of finances seem 
to go unanswered. Where population-based allocation does 
occur, it is in the allocation of pharmaceutical and consumable 
resources. However, the effectiveness of this allocation is 
undermined by high rates of internal migration into the Suva 
subdivision.65-67 Persistent shortages of pharmaceutical and 
consumable resources have been reported at these health 
centres since decentralisation (deconcentration) began.68 
With deconcentration only applied to the Suva subdivision, 
an important question is whether local discretion in the 
finance function would bring benefits in equity, efficiency, 
and quality of healthcare.
The decision space function of service organisation is also 
limited in how services are organised at the health centre 
level. Although health centre autonomy is defined by law, 
and the medical officer-in-charge has some leeway in day-
to-day operations of the health centre (resulting in variation 
in service delivery organisation for walk-in users), the 
package of programmes to be delivered at each health centre 
is prescribed by the central office. Whether decentralisation 
of service planning and organisation would better address 
variations in needs of local health centre populations is an 
important question that must be examined further. 
The health centres and, for that matter, the central office, 
have little or no control over human resource management. 
This has a major impact on local decision space created.17 A 
consistent shortage of health professionals over the years,69,70 
coupled with an inability to fill established posts, begs the 
question of whether these health centres are in a position to 
realise the benefits of decentralisation.
The importance of governance rules and popular participation 
are integral to creating decision space. Plagued by coup d’états 
and changes of governments, there has been limited popular 
participation in the health sector. The current decentralisation 
of health services has not flowed through to expanded popular 
participation. Whether popular participation would result in 
a more effective health system in an ethnically fragmented 
society, or further perpetuate ethnic divisions, is unclear in 
the case of Fiji.
However, a vital question that remains is: will autonomy 
for health centres result in gains in health outcomes? There 
have been mixed results in countries where decentralisation 
has taken place. In Fiji, whilst an increase of 300% has been 
reported in the utilisation of health services at the health 
centre level, funding for ambulatory care has declined.71 The 
increase in utilisation at each health facility corresponds with 
a decrease in time spent with each user of general outpatient 
services. Whilst there are variations in utilisation and time 
spent on users between health facilities, the consistent decline 
in time spent with each user following decentralisation may 
suggest a decline in quality. However, this needs further 
examination. An important question is whether the shift 
from healthcare users accessing the hospitals directly, to 
health centres being their principal point of contact with the 
health system, has resulted in health gains or improvement in 
accessing healthcare. However, deconcentration, has allowed 
the central office to focus on the development of tertiary 
services at hospital level, a cornerstone in the argument for 
the MoH to roll-out this form of deconcentration to other 
divisions. 
It is claimed that increasing decision space has numerous 
benefits.1,8,9 This paper has demonstrated that the level of 
decision space created following the decentralisation in the 
form of deconcentration has been minimal. With the aim of 
the deconcentration to improve access of users by bringing 
health services closer to them, creating decision space in the 
functions of service organisation, access rules and governance 
could facilitate the achievement of this goal. Future studies 
Table 3. Decision Space of Fiji’s Decentralised Suva Subdivision
Functions
Range of Choice
No Choice Narrow Moderate Wide
Finance
Sources of revenue Determined by MoH central office - - -
Allocation of expenditure
High percentage earmarked by MoH in collaboration 
with MoF
- - -
Income from fees No choice - determined by legislation - - -
Service Organisation
Health centre autonomy Defined by law - - -
Required programs
Basic package of programs defined by MoH central 
office
Flexibility to offer programs above the basic 
package, based on their resource
- -
Human Resources
Salaries None - defined by PSC - - -
Contracts None - determined by PSC regulations - - -
Civil service Determined by PSC - - -
Access Rules
Targeting Centrally defined priority populations
Flexibility to add above the centrally defined 
priority populations 
- -
Governance Rules
Facility boards Defined by legislation - - -
Community participation - Limited - -
Abbreviations: MoH, Ministry of Health; MoF, Ministry of Finance;  PSC, Public Services Commission.
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should focus on whether decision space is expanded as the 
Fijian health system continues to decentralise and if so, 
whether expected benefits follow. Further studies should 
also focus on whether decentralisation achieves its intended 
outcome of improving user’s access to healthcare. 
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